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ABSTRACT
This article examines the concept of Siyar and its relation to the dynamisation of
Islamic law. Siyar is a discipline in Islamic law covering issues of law of war and interna-
tional relations in Islamic traditions, which means conducting Muslim states in relation
with other communities. The efforts of the contextualisation of Siyar have been critical
primarily when Muslims have faced challenging realities of nation-states, globalisation
and post 9/11. This article arguably states that Siyar needs to be reinterpreted and revitalised
due to its classical idea is not compatible with the modern ideas and practices of modern
polity. Its main doctrine of bifurcation of the world (dâr al-Islâm and dâr al-%arb)
encourages arguments and practices of the defensive and offensive jihâd amongst Islamist
agencies. Accordingly, Muhammadiyah contextualised Siyar through its very idea of the
Negara Pancasila sebagai Dâr al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahâdah emphasising Indonesia as the
state of negotiation between the arenas of dâr al-Islâm and dâr al-%arb.
Keywords: Siyar; Dynamisation of Islamic law; Dâr al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahâdah;
Muhammadiyah; ijtihâd; Contemporary ijtihâd.
INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss a theoretical framework of Siyar, its relation to
the dynamisation of Islamic law,1 its contextualisation in the era of na-
tion-states and globalisation, and its representation by the case of
Muhammadiyah,2 Indonesia. Siyar itself is a special discipline in Islamic
law which terminologically means conducting Islamic or Muslim states in
relation with other communities.3 Conceptually, this discipline discusses
the discourse of law of war and international relations in Islamic tradi-
tions.4 This study is essential due to covering some crucial gaps. First of
all, the literature on Siyar, which has mainly been produced in Arab-Is-
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lamic academic traditions, has not discussed the concept in a wider re-
gional perspective, such as that of Southeast Asia. For example, some
Kitâb al-Siyar(s) have merely focused on the discussions on the scriptural
texts of the Qur’an and hadith, and on Muslim jurists’ opinions.5 Their
further contextualisation is limited to the Arab-Islam lands and primarily
to Middle Eastern countries. Even the most important literature of Siyar,
Kitâb al-Siyar authored by al-Shaybani never goes further, but within its
regional boundary.6 Second, Siyar has not covered the discourse of
dynamisation of Islamic law and its current contextualisation. In spite of
the fact that prominent Muslim scholars such as Tariq Ramadan, Khaled
Abou El Fadl and Ahmad Atif Ahmad have strongly encouraged to under-
take contemporary ijtihad (dynamisation and contextualisation of law) in
order to solve the current problems, in the field of Siyar, the suggested
ijtihad has remained in stagnant.7 Furthermore, since the time of incep-
tion (800s CE) to the current, specific studies that are concerned with the
law of war and international relations in Islamic traditions have never
dealt with the contemporary politics of Indonesia, let alone the
Muhammadiyah.8 The discourse of Islam in the region seems to be con-
sidered the peripheral that is not as important as the centre (the Middle
East).
This article argues that Siyar needs to be reinterpreted and
contextualised in accordance with the dynamic changes of era. It is be-
cause the classical notion of Siyar is not compatible with the modern
Western political ideas and practices such as modern state, governance
and system of law. Its primary doctrine which divides the world into dâr
al-Islâm and dâr al-%arb, has conditioned ideas of defensive and offen-
sive jihad. These ideas, moreover, have been often instrumentalised by
Islamists in order to legitimate their political and ideological activities. In
dealing with this part, Muhammadiyah proclaimed a notion of
contextualisation of Siyar namely Negara Pancasila9 sebagai Dâr al-‘Ahd
wa al-Shahâdah (the state of Pancasila as the state of consensus and wit-
ness) in their 47th Congress in 2015.10 In the context of Indonesia and
Southeast Asia, it can be claimed that Muhammadiyah is the only one
which has initiated the alternative notion of Siyar. Generally in the case of
Muhammadiyah’s Siyar, dâr al-‘ahd is neither dâr al-Islâm (the state of
Islam) nor dâr al-%arb (the state of war). It is an idea of negotiation be-
tween both arenas. Indeed, this Southeast Asian version of Siyar might
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contribute to the current development of the scholarly discipline Siyar.
In the particular case of Muhammadiyah, the idea was offered in the
context of a massive growth of Islamist sentiment in the post-reformation
era in Indonesia. Islamist sentiments have sharpened ideologies of Islamism
which controversially have been articulated using the jargon of Islamisation
or formalisation of Sharî‘ah in the country.11 Although there have been
various Islamist groups, they have tended to have a similar understanding
that the Indonesian political system is un-Islamic. In the Siyar perspective,
since they believed that Indonesia is dâr al-%arb (a non-Islamic state or a
state of war), it should be transformed into dâr al-Islâm (an Islamic state).
In considering it, Sydney Jones’ reflection on the political reformation that
has resulted in not only democratisation but also the emergence of reli-
gious conservatism,12 is relevant. While the New Order regime fell in 1998,
it not only ended the authoritarianism of Suharto, but also opened the
wider and contentious door of Islamist conservatism. In this case, as a
consequence, Indonesia and also Muhammadiyah faced the undeniable
challenges of Islamist ideologies and movements which were strongly anti-
democracy.
SIYAR IN ISLAMIC TRADITIONS (SIYAR AND ITS POSITION IN
ISLAMIC LAW)
Siyar as a part of Islamic law developed as a non-monolithic tradition.
It is represented by various Muslim jurists (fuqahâ’) and scholars (‘ulamâ’)
whose ideas engaged with the Sunni schools of law – the Hanafi, Maliki,
Shafi‘i and Hanbali schools.13 Since it was the intellectual product of both
fuqahâ’ and ‘ulamâ’, it can be considered a specific part of fiqh. Accord-
ingly, some have named it fiqh al-siyar, which means the fiqh or the Is-
lamic jurisprudence covering the issues of Siyar.14
Where is the position of Siyar as a part of fiqh in Islamic law? In the
system of Islamic law, there are producers or law makers, sources of law,
methodology of making law and products of law. Producers of law are
the fuqahâ’ and ‘ulamâ’. Their sources in making law (macâdir li al-istinbâm
al-a%kâm al-shar‘iyyah) are primarily al-Qur’ân and %adîth (the Prophetic
tradition), and secondarily ijmâ‘ (consensus), qiyâs (analogy), isti%sân (pref-
erence) and macla%ah (public interests).15 When there is a case of law
that cannot be solved referring to these sources, ijtihâd (the earnest effort
of rational and critical reasoning which is based on various common val-
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ues contained in the Qur’ân and %adîth) is undoubtedly needed.16 The
process when they are producing law is istinbâm al-a%kâm. The method-
ology of their istinbâm al-a%kâm is ucûl al-fiqh (Islamic legal theory). The
product is fiqh – that is, the Muslim jurists’ and scholars’ informed under-
standing of the ‘law’. This is where we must position Siyar in the larger
corpus of Islamic law. Furthermore, the application of fiqh is only possible
when it becomes qânûn (legislation). In the context of Siyar, it should be
qânûn al-siyar. Its applications, however, should not undermine the higher
values of morality inherent in Islamic law, such as rightness, justice, peace
and humanity.17
SIYAR AND THE PLURALISM OF LAW
Since there have been diverse opinions of the fuqaha’ and ulama’,
Islamic law is characterised by pluralism. This pluralism occurs due to dif-
ferent abilities among Muslim intellectuals in terms of their expertise in
Islamic sciences such as târîkh (history), falsafah (philosophy), tacawwuf
(mysticism), tafsîr (quranic exegesis), al-%adîth wa ‘ulûmuha (Prophetic
tradition and its specific sciences), kalâm (theology) and many others.
Their expertise strongly influences their understanding of macâdir al-a%kâm
(sources of law), marîqah li al-istinbâm al-a%kâm al-shar‘iyyah (ucûl al-
fiqh) (methodology in making law), fiqh (product of law), and qânûn (leg-
islation) and al-a%kâm al-tashri‘yyah (its applications). As a consequence,
since Siyar is a product of Muslims’ creativity and not the divine law that
comes from the heaven, there is no single, fixed and definite Islamic Siyar.
It means, borrowing Muhammad Sa’id al-Ashmawi’s critical reflection,
that the ‘manifestation’ of Islamic law or Sharî‘ah (fiqh) is a mundane and
secular thing due to Muslims as law makers cannot free from their own
possible fallibility.18 Accordingly, the validity of all products of Muslims’
understanding is totally relative.19
SIYAR, ITS SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE
Siyar terminologically means paths or ways20 taken when Muslims in-
teract with other communities. In the history of Islam, when the modern
state institution had not been established yet, there was the pre-modern
state based on a religious identity. When Muhammad became a religious
and political leader in Medina, he also regulated certain rules in dealing
with other communities such as Jews, Christians and Pagans.21 His rules
144 AFKARUNA
consisted of the ways to behave justly and fairly in many aspects of life,
including trade and taxation, safety and security, as well as war and peace.
His rules inspired Muslims over the centuries to develop the notion of
Siyar. As mentioned by Majid Khadduri, Siyar as a discipline of Islamic law
was popularised by a Hanafi jurist, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani
(749-805).22
In general, Siyar distinguishes two categories of community, Muslims
and non-Muslims. Non-Muslims are divided into three categories, namely
mu%âribûn (those in constant war with Muslims), ahl al-‘ahd (those in
covenant with Muslims) and ahl al-dhimma (the protected non-Muslims
under Muslim authority).23 According to these categories, moreover, the
territory in Siyar is divided into two parts: the first is the territory of Mus-
lims (dâr al-Islâm) and the second is the territory of mu%âribûn (dâr al-
%arb). Muslim jurists from Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali circles tended to
agree with this notion of the dichotomous division of territory, except
Shafi‘i jurists who articulated a third category, the territory of ahl al-‘ahd
(dâr al-‘ahd or dar al-sul%).24
A territory or a state can be classified as dâr al-Islâm because it meets
some fundamental requirements such as the state should be governed by
an Islamic authority, Islamic law should be enforced, and Muslims have
the right to carry out their religious duties. While these requirements can-
not be fulfilled, a state will be classified as dâr al-%arb due to the reason
that it will threaten the security of Muslims (amân).25 However, if the state
remains in the category which is neither dâr al-Islâm nor dâr al-%arb, but
Muslims have their own religious freedom and security because of the
protection of either Muslim or non-Muslim authority, it may be categorised
as dâr al-‘ahd. It means, there must be such a certain agreement or con-
sensus between the ruler and the people that the state will guarantee the
people’s amân, particularly allowing Muslims to practise the faith unin-
terrupted. However, although the majority views of various schools of law
do not make a consensus (ijmâ’), they seem to disagree with the concept
of dâr al-‘ahd, with Shafi‘i jurists representing a minority view.26
The fundamental objective of the establishment and protection of the
dâr al-‘ahd is to create “baldatun mayyibatun wa rabbun ghafûr” (the
great state with God’s blessings).27 When in the Prophetic era, the proto-
type of this ideal state was manifested in the state of Medina, in the
following era of the Rightly Guided Caliphs (al-Khulafâ’ al-Râshidûn), Abu
145Vol. 15 No. 2 Desember 2019
Bakr, Umar ibn Khattab, Uthman ibn Affan and ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib expanded
the territory of Islam with the assumption that they must proselytise the
Islamic teachings.28 After al-Râshidûn, the political power of Islam devel-
oped massively, as represented by three great Muslim empires: the Otto-
man, Safavid and Moghul.29 Despite the vast expanses of Muslim lands,
for many believers the idealised objective of dâr al-Islâm has not yet been
fully realised. When Islam is understood by its believers generally as the
grace for the universe, it is assumed that Islam should spread its great
virtue throughout the world. Whether this achievable or not, there is no
doubt that Islam can be viewed as a cosmopolitan religion.
In the context of politics, governance system and international rela-
tions, of course ideally, the cosmopolitan character of Islam intends to
subdue all mankind under the umbrella of Islamic salvation. This idea is
usually framed in a special theme of Islam, namely the development of
the ummah. There are various meanings regarding the notion of the
ummah. One views the ummah as a micro community of believers,30 while
others understand it as the state institution31 or some scholars more cre-
atively even regard it as the league of nations, either in the sense of pan-
Arabism or pan-Islamism,32 and one extreme position believes that the
ummah is the global Islamic state.33 Given that the concept means differ-
ent things, the cosmopolitan character of Islam should be problematised,
primarily in terms of whether it is only a moral inspiration or should be
embodied in a political institution within territorial boundaries.
In dealing with the notion of the ummah, Siyar offers relevant guid-
ance. According to Majid Khadduri, when Islam is understood as the true
religion and its embodiment is the political institution of dâr al-Islâm, it
follows that there is an obligation to expand this realm in line with the
obligation of proselytising the salvation narrative of Islam.34 In this con-
text, Siyar covers the issues of territorial expansion through offensive jihâd,
and the issues of territorial defence and security in defensive jihâd. Siyar
thus not only governs Muslims’ relations with other communities and
international relations, but also the law of war.
SIYAR AND THE DYNAMISATION OF ISLAMIC LAW
In the context of defensive jihâd, fuqahâ’ tend to agree that this idea is
important. It is also equal to the Western law of war (just war) which
governs the concept jus ad bellum (law governing resort to war) and jus
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in bello (the law governing conduct in war).35 In the context of offensive
jihâd, however, this idea developed mainly from the history of the Prophet
Muhammad, and also the practices and attitudes of Muslim Companions
of the Prophet and the leaders of Muslim empires (caliphs or sultans).36
The idea of offensive jihâd in the current period, however, conjures up
disturbing images of unbridled radicalism and suggests pursuit of the
goal of the ummah at the cost of the fundamental values of Islam. The
sub-field of Islamic law that deals with international relationships, which
has conventionally dealt with war, needs also to provide a regime for
counter-movements – that is, those that seek to promote peaceful rela-
tions. However, to do so, Siyar itself has to be reformed and in turn be
contextualised following the current changes of Muslim life. Philosophi-
cally, this effort is tied to what I have called the dynamisation of Islamic
law in general and of Siyar in particular.
From the perspective of the philosophy of Islamic law, there are three
assumptions that underlie the dynamisation of Islamic law and the
contextualisation of Siyar. First, Islamic law needs constantly to keep pace
with evolving social conditions so as to remain relevant. Second, when
Islamic law is not continually renewed, it runs the risk of becoming rigid
and formalistic, opening it even to manipulation and political abuse. Third,
the ideas and practices of Islamic law must not contradict maqâcid al-
sharî‘ah (the higher objectives of Islamic law) which, in the view of mod-
ern writers, prioritise the values of rightness, justice, peace, safety and
security, and also humanity and human dignity.37
First, in order to maintain its relevance in light of societal changes,
Islamic law has to evolve as well. Philosophically, Islam is perceived as the
religion that is always relevant across space and time (Islam, sâli% li kulli
makân wa zamân). One Muslim intellectual emphasises that Islam’s val-
ues are is elevated and surpass others (al-Islâm, ya’lu wa lâ yu’la ‘alaih);
they are inspirational for the development of human civilisation. Yet, when
these values have been reformulated as fiqh and legislation (qânûn wa
tashrî’), both of them should reflect these fundamental values of Islam.38
In addition, while it is obvious that the texts of law are limited, at the
same time they have to face unlimited human problems. Accordingly, the
hermeneutics of law should be based on the values behind the texts rather
than the texts themselves (al-‘ibrah fî al-maqâcid, lâ bi al-alfâ“).39 In this
context, prominent Muslim intellectuals such as Fazlur Rahman, Abdullah
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Saeed and Tariq Ramadan emphasise the importance of elaborating
intertextuality and intercontextuality of the sources of Islamic law in order
to extract ‘global messages’ behind them, and also of understanding the
complexities of current situations.40
Second, when Islamic law is not being dynamised, it results in two
kinds of taqlîd (imitation or stagnation): the first is taqlîd in terms of imi-
tating everything that is mentioned in the fiqh;41 and the second is taqlîd
in applying the ucûl al-fiqh. In this context, Ali Ahmad Said’s critical re-
flection on the Arab-Islamic archaeology of knowledge is apt. He argues
that the stagnation of law is caused by the absence of dynamisation.42 In
his view, it is due to Muslim jurists believing that the form of law is more
important than its substance. Furthermore, he diagnoses there is a prob-
lem of taqlîd in terms of methodology, which means Muslim jurists tend
to accept the operationalisation of certain methods without any critical
consideration.43 The controversial Egyptian scholar, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd,
who fell foul of Islamists with his hermeneutic approach to Quranic inter-
pretation, argued that Islamic civilisation resulted in the ‘civilisation of the
text’ (%aârah al-nac)44 — a kind of textual dogmatism. Consequently, the
complex realities of life were reduced to a textualist-scripturalist and le-
galistic framework. Khaled Abou El Fadl cautions that, in certain cases,
scripturalism and legalism of Islam have led to religious despotism and
authoritarianism.45 For example, jihâd as a part of Siyar can wrongly be
interpreted as an offensive action that is permissible in the name of reli-
gion, even though it damages core Islamic principles.
Third, according to the first and second argument, it can be under-
stood that the product of Islamic law must not contradict the higher moral
values of Islam (maqâcid al-Sharî‘ah). This argument is based on a propo-
sition of the Islamic law, al-‘ibrah fî al-maqâcid (the essentials of the law
are inherently available in the higher objectives of the law).46 Indeed, some
Muslim reformers assert that in understanding Islam we should emphasise
its substantive values rather than the formal application of fiqh. They ar-
gue that this is accord with Prophetic mission: “And We have not sent
you, [O Muhammad], except as a mercy to the worlds.”47 This approach
privileges contextualisation and an effort at ‘neo-ijtihâd’ in order to avoid
the stagnation of law.48
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THE CONTEXTUALISATION OF SIYAR IN THE ERA OF NATION-
STATES AND GLOBALISATION
The contextualisation of Siyar means not only its practical applicability
in a new situations, but also the revitalisation of its values in order to
maintain its relevance. This is based on two arguments: first, the classical
Siyar cannot be applied in the context of nation-states; second, in the
context of globalisation, Siyar tends to be instrumentalised as a legitima-
tion of the ideology of Islamist conservatism which, in turn, can open
larger possibilities for the radicalisation of religion.
First, it cannot be doubted that the classical notion of Siyar almost
entirely cannot be applied in the context of nation-states. The trend of
the modern state institution that was initiated by Western civilisation has
been relatively practised throughout countries in the world since the nine-
teenth century. Regarding this phenomenon, James Piscatori highlights
that at least some Muslim countries tend to ‘partially’ adapt this trend
into their political systems.49 This partial adaptation pertains to Saudi Arabia
and Iran, for instance. Saudi Arabia was established as an Islamic monar-
chy led by a king. The symbol of this state is “lâ ilâha illa Allâh wa
Muhammad rasûlullâh” (there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the
Messenger of Allah). This state is governed – at least in official self-pre-
sentations – with the Qur’ân and Sunnah (the Prophetic tradition) as its
constitution. In addition, although Iran is a republic, which is similar to a
modern state institution, its political system was modified with Islamic
political thought in a modern Shia form (velâyat-e faqîh). Whatever their
official narratives of Islamic legitimacy, their political behaviour in terms
of international relations combines their ideological, political and eco-
nomic interests. Bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and the United
States, or between Iran and Russia, have eliminated in practice the
operationalisation of the majority view of the classical Siyar which strictly
distinguishes between dâr al-Islâm and dâr al-%arb.50
For other Muslim countries, furthermore, the concept of nation-states
that reflects European values of such as Westphalianism has been popu-
larly practised, although religious values are still important in shaping and
colouring their constitutions. In this context, Turkey, Egypt, Malaysia and
Indonesia can serve as examples.51 Despite the fact that Siyar would not
be unknown, at least to the religious elites, they do not apply it because it
tends to undermine the principle of autonomy of the state. The relevance
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of Siyar has been understood as inspirational ideas that support their val-
ues of nationalism and patriotism. In Indonesia, the two biggest Muslim
organisations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, have clearly
declared that a politically secular Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan
Republik Indonesia, NKRI) is final.52 Therefore, Siyar as classically under-
stood does not pertain to the modern state system as it applies to modern
Muslim states: those that might be considered ‘Islamic’ states do not ad-
here to the bifurcated idea of the world; those that have a majority Mus-
lim population do not institutionalise Islamic law as integral to the state
order – that is, they are not dâr al-Islâm.
Second, in the context of globalisation, one of the main doctrines of
Siyar, jihâd has accompanied, and may have ideologically encouraged,
the rise of Islamist resurgence and possibly terrorism.53 In this era of
globalisation, when human migrations have occurred massively and glo-
bal communications – due to the development of science and technology
– have been widely accessible, interchanges of identities, cultures, tradi-
tions, and religions have happened easily. As Olivier Roy argues,
globalisation has resulted in not only the openness with which Muslims
have encountered differences, but also crises of identity that have led to
the protectionist behaviour of Islamist revivalism.54 Furthermore, the ter-
rorist attack of 11 September 2011 dramatically delineated the impact of
Islamist radicalism on a global scale and thus a new, and troubling,
instrumentalisation of Siyar. The confidence in distinguishing between the
identity of Muslims and that of the infidels (kâfirûn) and promoting war
in the name of religion is a discernibly widespread feature of the current
landscape.55
Both these points suggest that the Siyar needs to be reconsidered to-
day in order to respond to the new challenging realities. It needs to re-
spond to the persistence of the modern state system at the same time as
it re-affirms the underlying core values of moderation and pluralism that
the majority of Muslims believe to be inherent in the Scriptural sources of
Islam.
THE MODERN CONTEXTUALISATION OF SIYAR: THE CASE OF
MUHAMMADIYAH
It is important to examine the concept of Siyar that has been devel-
oped by Muhammadiyah in the multiple contexts of nation-state,
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globalisation, and the post-9/11 and post-authoritarian era of Indonesia.
As mentioned before, in 2015, this organisation conceptualised the no-
tion of Negara Pancasila sebagai Dâr al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahâdah (the state of
Pancasila as the state of consensus and witness)56 as a representation of
the current development of the concept of Siyar. In considering it, this
paper highlights two essential things: first, the way Muhammadiyah rec-
onciles the state principles of Pancasila and Siyar, and, second, its way of
relating the notion of Negara Pancasila sebagai Dâr al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahâdah
to its views of Indonesian democracy. This can also be understood as the
former emphasising “what is the thought that Muhammadiyah has pro-
duced,” whereas the latter underlines “how does Muhammadiyah con-
struct this thought.”
In the perspective of Islamic legal thought, this exploration has brought
us to the development of a key concept of Islamic law, ijtihâd.57 Ijtihâd
literally means a strong effort, but conceptually it involves a strong en-
deavour to think rationally, critically and creatively in order to overcome
problems whose solution cannot be found in the Qur’ân and %adîth, and
also other sources such as ijmâ‘ (consensus), qiyâs (analogy), isti%sân (pref-
erence), and icticla% (public good).58 This exploration, furthermore, re-
lates the discourse of ijtihâd to the specific discipline of Siyar that has
been practised by Muhammadiyah. Accordingly, it invites us to discuss
the significance of Muhammadiyah’s ijtihâd to the development of both
the discipline of Siyar and the discourse of ijtihâd in general, which, more
broadly, connect with the issue of the dynamisation of Islamic law and
Islamic thought that underpins our entire analysis.
As a result of its ijtihâd, Muhammadiyah offers the notion of Negara
Pancasila sebagai Dâr al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahâdah as an intellectual reconcilia-
tion between the state ideology of Pancasila and the doctrine of Siyar.59
This ijtihâd is based on its fundamental basis of thought and self-styled
movement called Islam Berkemajuan (progressive Islam),60 whereby Islam
should be viewed progressively as a problem-solving religion. Muham-
madiyah argues that it should provide solutions for current human and
societal problems.61 In the context of its ijtihâd, however, it has faced chal-
lenging realities in the significant spread of conservative and radical Islamism
throughout the post-political reformation in Indonesia. This spread, from
Muhammadiyah’s perspective, is a serious threat that can potentially lead
to national disintegration since the Islamists have criticised the status of
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Indonesia as a state (due to the fact it is not considered dar al-Islam or an
Islamic state) and its political system (it is not a Sharî‘ah system).
In dealing with this threat, Muhammadiyah promotes one of the con-
cepts of Siyar, namely dâr al-‘ahd (the state of consensus), instead of dâr
al-Islâm (the Islamic state) or dâr al-%arb (the state of war). Muhammadiyah
argues that Indonesia is the state based on Pancasila (Negara Pancasila),
and since Pancasila was conceptualised through the national consensus
by its founding fathers, Indonesia should be understood as the state of
consensus (dâr al-‘ahd) – that is, neither the Islamic state nor the state of
war. Through this argument, Muhammadiyah emphasises that it supports
a moderate Islamic concept of democracy. However, support is not enough;
rather, it believes that guaranteeing the process of substantial democra-
tisation and the state development of Indonesia is needed. Accordingly,
Muhammadiyah adds the concept of dâr al-shahâdah (literally means the
state of witness, or the space of testimony). With this conceptual addi-
tion, Muhammadiyah intends at encouraging its activists and Indonesian
Muslims to strongly bear a witness or testimony that Muhammadiyah is
an important part of Indonesia. As a consequence, in dealing with the
testimony, both Muhammadiyah activists and Indonesian Muslims gener-
ally should involve themselves in an agenda of state democratisation and
development in order to ensure that the ideal of Indonesia becoming “the
sovereign, just and prosperous state which is granted by God’s blessing”
(baldatun mayyibatun wa rabbun ghafûr) will be achieved. In this con-
text, Muhammadiyah suggests that all Indonesians, and mainly Indone-
sian Muslims, should become “witnesses” to the development of Indone-
sian civilisation (Indonesia Berkemajuan). Thus, through the ijtihâd of Is-
lam Berkemajuan which is represented by the concept of Negara Pancasila
sebagai Dâr al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahâdah, Muhammadiyah wants to make the
ideals of Indonesia Berkemajuan come true.
In addition, closely relating to its way of ijtihâd, Muhammadiyah at-
tempts to build a connection between its concept of Negara Pancasila
sebagai Dâr al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahâdah and its idea of democracy. In build-
ing this connection, Muhammadiyah has conducted an approach of
theologising democracy. This approach means developing democracy as
a paradigm built on a theological interpretation of Islam that emphasises
the importance of democratic values such as shûra (people’s sovereignty
or consultation), ‘adâlah (justice), musâwah (equality), and %urriyyah (free-
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dom) among others. Muhammadiyah has tended to undertake this task
via the two ways of objectification and substantialisation of Islam. While
the former means transforming Pancasila into an objective language of
Islam that can, at the same time, be understood and accepted by all Indo-
nesian citizens beyond their religious, ethnic, racial and cultural identities,
the latter means reinterpreting Pancasila as a manifestation of the sub-
stantial values of Islam.
Muhammadiyah has undertaken both these efforts based on histori-
cal, political, sociological and theological arguments. Historically,
Muhammadiyah contributed to the conceptualisation of Pancasila and
the establishment of the state of Indonesia through its elites, activists and
activities mainly in the fields of education, health and philanthropy (this
consensual activity is thought to be consistent with the dâr al-‘ahd idea).
In a related way, Muhammadiyah recognises that it is a part of Indonesia
and must take a responsibility in developing the state and nation (thus
consistent with its ‘witness’ responsibilities under the concept of dâr al-
shahâdah). Politically, Muhammadiyah tends to view that Pancasila is a
manifestation of the secularisation of the political system, since it is per-
ceived as neither the concept of Islamism nor a secularism that is anti-
faith. Accordingly, Muhammadiyah with its moderate Islamic thought at-
tempts to bridge the essential values of Sharî‘ah (maqâcid) and the mod-
ern political system of democracy. In another words, Pancasila is inher-
ently Islamic due to its conceptualisation and comprehension based on
Islamic values, but it is not dogmatically Islamic or the model for an Is-
lamic state. Sociologically, the majority of Muhammadiyah activists have
tended to believe in the doctrine of Islamic moderatism (wasatiyyah), which
is consistent with the intellectual elaborations we have explored. Last but
not least, theologically, Muhammadiyah offers an interpretation of Islam
that affirms it has democratic values, while, at the same time, arguing
that a democracy, by its very nature, is essentially Islamic. In another words,
Muhammadiyah argues that while Pancasila is not an Islamic ideology, its
values of democratic pluralism are fully consistent with the teachings of
Islam: there is thus no contradiction between the ideologies of Pancasila
and of ‘progressive Islam’.
However, on the level of implementation, Muhammadiyah has seri-
ously struggled in both theologising democracy and implementing the
product of its ijtihâd. It has done so because of the challenges it faces. In
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terms of theologising democracy, its main challenges have been the
formalisation of Sharî‘ah, Maududian political thought, which calls for
Islamising politics, and takfiri ideology that has been exclusivist and judge-
mental. Moreover, in terms of disseminating and implementing the result
of its ijtihâd, Muhammadiyah has had to deal with the rise of Islamist
ideology among some of its own members and of the emergence of Is-
lamist populism.
Despite these concerning trends for Muhammadiyah, its application
of a modern ijtihâd can be seen as a significant contribution to the
dynamisation of Islamic legal thought in Indonesia, specifically in the con-
text of the development of the discourse of Siyar. Its effort at theologising
democracy (objectification and substantialisation of Islam) and produc-
ing a concept of moderation linking Islam and democracy, is viewed as
having potential for the future. Din Syamsuddin argues that one contri-
bution that Muhammadiyah can make, in terms of the dynamisation of
its spirit, is transforming its philosophical basis of “retaining the good
from the past and adopting a better present” (al-mu%âfa“ah ‘ala al-qadîm
al-câli% wa al-akhdhu bi al-jadîd al-acla%) into “maintaining the best from
the past and creating the most excellent in the present” (al-mu%âfa“ah
‘ala al-qadîm al-acla% wa al-ijâd bi al-ajdâd al-câli%ah).62
Muhammadiyah’s achievement could possibly be considered as a model
of the revival, even energising, of Islamic law for other Muslim countries.
Wael Hallaq, an expert of Islamic law, argues that the Islamic state is ‘im-
possible’ to adopt and to practice in the modern system of states – a view
consistent with the Siyar discussion of this article.63 However, the notion
of Negara Pancasila sebagai Dâr al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahâdah is suggestive as a
way to reconcile Islamic understandings with modern political ones.
Muhammadiyah is not alone in this quest: Indonesian Muslim intellectu-
als such as Nurcholish Madjid, Abdurrahman Wahid and Ahmad Syafii
Maarif have argued along similar lines. Another scholar of Islamic law,
Ahmad Atif Ahmad, argues that Sharî‘ah as many Muslims either under-
stand or practice it has been problematic.64 The ‘fatigue’ of the Sharî‘ah
has been caused by the lack of ijtihâd and its agencies (mujtahidîn) in the
Muslim world.65 In this regard, the effort of Muhammadiyah’s ijtihâd can
be seen as consistent with Atif Ahmad’s suggestion. Whether it can also
be a model of Islamic secularity66 – ‘progressive’, ‘moderate’, and ‘demo-
cratic’ as Muhammadiyah claims to represent – remains to be seen.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article has reviewed the importance of Siyar in the system of Is-
lamic law. It has shown that Siyar is not equivalent to Sharî‘ah, since Siyar
is fiqh that covers the issues of the law of war and international relations
in Islamic traditions. Accordingly, as the product of Muslim juristic thought,
Siyar is possible to be redeveloped. This redevelopment is important be-
cause of two things. First, the classical notion of Siyar is not compatible
with the modern state system as it has been practised by modern Muslim
states. Second, in the context of globalisation, the classical doctrines of
Siyar such as the bifurcated idea of the world (dâr al-Islâm and dâr al-
%arb) and of community (Muslims and infidels), and the idea of either
defensive or offensive jihad, have been often instrumentalised by both
revivalist and radical Muslims in order to legitimate their political and
ideological activities. Regarding these double challenges, the Siyar needs,
therefore, to be reformed and recontextualised. In other words, some
Muslims argue that it is important to maintain the modern state system
but also revitalise the values of moderation and pluralism that the major-
ity of Muslims believe in.
The idea of contextual isat ion of Siyar was undertaken by
Muhammadiyah through its concept of Negara Pancasila sebagai Dâr al-
‘Ahd wa al-Shahâdah. The concept means that Indonesia that fundamen-
tally was established by principles of Pancasila is the state of consensus
and witness. The state of consensus emphasises that the state establish-
ment is based on the consensus of all Indonesian people as well as Mus-
lims and Muhammadiyah activists. Accordingly, this concept puts Indone-
sia as not the Islamic state (dâr al-Islâm) nor the state of Muslims’ enemy
(dâr al-%arb). It is the very notion of negotiation between both arenas
(dâr al-‘ahd). The state of witness highlights the importance of Muslims’
involvements in the process of state development in order to evolve the
progressive civilisation of Indonesia (peradaban Indonesia berkemajuan).
This Muhammadiyah initiation and achievement, indeed, conceptu-
ally might reflect the Southeast Asian version of Siyar which is different
from its Arab-Islam version. Accordingly, it is really possible to offer the
concept as an alternative in the field of law of war and international rela-
tions in Islamic traditions which tends to be neither exclusivist nor expan-
sionist. Yet, the concept needs to be scholarly contested further. The de-
velopment of the concept would be dependent on the roles played by
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scholars have supported and it has remained open to be seen.[]
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